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1. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007).
2. REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES: ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT 4 (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/mcjc_2007.authcheckdam.pdf.
3. Id. at 5.
4. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at R. 3.6, cmt. 2.
5. THE BAR ASSOC. OF SAN FRANCISCO EQUALITY COMM. REPORT ON LES-
BIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER ISSUES 1 (2007),
http://www.sfbar.org/forms/diversity/lgbt_report_nov07_basf.pdf.
6. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
In 2007, the American Bar Association (ABA) updated theModel Code of Judicial Conduct (the “Code”) to include theterm “domestic partner,” which it defined as “a person with
whom another person maintains a household and an intimate
relationship, other than a person to whom he or she is legally
married.”1 The ABA asserted the importance of adding
“domestic partner” to the Code was that “commonplace ‘non-
traditional’ relationships that exist outside marriage are deserv-
ing of treatment equal to that afforded marital relationships in
evaluating their potential conflict-of-interest implications.”2
This update recognized “the fact that it is desirable to have a
uniform system of ethical principles that applies to all individ-
uals serving a judicial function.”3
Many states have amended their Codes of Judicial Conduct
(CJCs) to include the term “domestic partner.” But the term
“domestic partner” is often associated with same-sex relation-
ships and is, for certain purposes, defined to exclude other
types of relationships. This paper will argue that some of the
states that have chosen not to include the term “domestic part-
ner” in their CJC likely did so as a result of this term’s associ-
ation with lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
advocacy. States that have a history of resisting the advance-
ment of LGBT equality have consistently chosen not to include
the term “domestic partner” in their CJC, perhaps to avoid the
appearance of support for LGBT equality. The exclusion of the
term “domestic partner” in these states’ CJCs reflects a partisan
stance and is based on an incomplete understanding of the
benefits gained by including the term in a CJC. This paper will
also acknowledge and discuss why some states chose not to
include the term “domestic partner” in their CJCs, despite a
history of support for LGBT equality. Further, this paper will
argue that the ABA’s introduction of the term “domestic part-
ner” in the 2007 Code is an intelligent and effective promotion
of judicial integrity, which should be adopted by all states,
notwithstanding their stance on LGBT issues.
I. “DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS” REFER TO MANY 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS, BUT THE 
TERM HAS BEEN WIDELY USED TO PROMOTE LGBT
EQUALITY.
A plain reading of the ABA’s definition of “domestic partner”
includes unmarried heterosexual and same-sex couples whose
relationships are comparable to those of lawfully married cou-
ples, but who are not married. This definition of “domestic
partner” is open enough to potentially include polyamorous or
polygamous intimate relationships. The ABA’s definition could
also refer to a close, platonic relationship between people who
live together, since the Code’s use of the term ‘intimate’ sug-
gests that sexual relations are not an inherent prerequisite.4
Yet, the term “domestic partner” has been used extensively
by LGBT advocates, including advocates in the legal profes-
sion. In November 2007, for example, the Bar Association for
San Francisco issued a report on the best practices for employ-
ers to use to promote LGBT equality and inclusion within their
workforce.5 For example, the report urged employers to create
an LGBT-inclusive culture through the use of affirming lan-
guage, specifically by using marriage-neutral terms.6 Specifi-
cally, the report explained:
An LGBT attorney who is in a committed relationship
appreciates having his or her employer show respect for
that relationship. When the law office issues an invita-
tion to a business function to employees and their
“spouses” without also including non-marriage specific
terminology, the company fails to signal that respect.
Outside of [the few states that allow same-sex marriage],
“spouse” means opposite-sex husband or wife. Using the
term in invitations suggests to LGBT employees that they
are invisible to the employer, or that the employer does
not respect their relationships. . . . This small change in
wording can have a big impact on firm culture.7
The term “domestic partner” within the report referred
exclusively to same-sex couples.8
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Further, the ABA Commission on Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity  released a report in 2011 echoing the Bar of
San Francisco’s 2007 recommendations, though the ABA has
not yet adopted the recommendations.9 In almost identical lan-
guage, the ABA Commission’s report encouraged employers to
“[e]nsure that social invitations are inclusive by using wording
that invites partners, not just spouses,” while defining “domes-
tic partnerships” as same-sex partnerships. Thus, LGBT advo-
cates frequently use the term “domestic partner” to refer exclu-
sively to same-sex couples and to promote LGBT equality.
Likewise, some states have used the term “domestic part-
ner” to refer exclusively to same-sex couples. Instead of the
ABA’s broad, open-ended definition of “domestic partner,” Cal-
ifornia explicitly defined “domestic partnership” by statute as
a same-sex relationship.10 California’s Code of Judicial Ethics
uses the term “registered domestic partner” to denote a person
who has registered for a domestic partnership pursuant to state
law or who is recognized as a domestic partner pursuant to the
California Family Code.11 In California, only same-sex couples
can apply for domestic-partnership status, though there is a
narrow exception for unmarried heterosexual couples over 62
years of age.12 In California, a “registered domestic partner-
ship” is a legally recognized relationship that has the same
specificity and determinability as a heterosexual marriage.
Although the ABA could have Code defined “domestic part-
ner” to refer only to same-sex relationships, it specifically
opted not to do so despite the existence of exclusively LGBT
definitions, such as California’s. This is especially true in light
of the fact that the ABA’s past advocacy for same-sex marriage
and LGBT adoption rights is documented. 
However, the use of the term “domestic partner” in the
Code’s 2007 revisions arguably did not represent similar advo-
cacy. Since California and even the ABA’s Commission report
define “domestic partner” as referring only to same-sex cou-
ples, the ABA would have explicitly defined a “domestic part-
ner” as a member of a same-sex couple if the purpose of
including this term was LGBT advocacy. Instead, the inclusion
of the term “domestic partner” in the Code practically and
intelligently holds all judges to the same level of accountabil-
ity, regardless of their relationship status or sexual orientation. 
II. THE INCLUSION OF “DOMESTIC PARTNER” IN THE
2007 CODE EFFECTIVELY PROMOTES JUDICIAL
INTEGRITY
The Code’s standard for when a judge must recuse herself or
himself is the most stringent when the case regards the judge’s
spouse or domestic partner because it not only requires recusal
from a case involving a spouse or domestic partner’s interest,
but also from cases which involve the interest of the spouse or
domestic partner’s close relatives. This standard is in recogni-
tion of the greater importance a spouse or domestic partner’s
family may play in a judge’s life when compared to the role of
the family of an acquaintance or roommate. Thus, the Code
instructs judges to recuse themselves in cases where a person
within the third degree of relationship to the judge, the judge’s
spouse, or the judge’s domestic partner has more than a de min-
imis interest in the proceeding, which could be substantially
impacted by the proceeding’s outcome.13
The Code also requires judicial recusal when the judge, the
judge’s spouse, domestic partner, parent, child, or any member
of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household has an
economic interest in the subject matter.14 Thus, the Code
expands the grounds for recusal by requiring a judge to with-
draw from a case where the judge’s domestic partner, spouse, or
a close family member of either has an interest in the case. The
ABA explains that the addition of “domestic partner” in Rule
2.11 will require domestic partners and spouses to be treated
comparably for purposes of evaluating economic conflicts.15
The ABA’s 2007 Code appropriately uses “spouse” and
“domestic partner” for judicial recusal purposes, as domestic
partners influence judges as much as spouses. Since spouses
usually play a more important role in a judge’s life than any
other person, the Code requires a judge’s recusal for conflicts
arising from the judge’s relationship to the spouse and the
spouse’s relatives. Of course, if any other person occupies a
role in the judge’s life comparable to that of a spouse, then the
judicial code should have the same recusal requirements. 
Absent the term “domestic partner,” a judicial ethics code
could inappropriately fail to mandate a judge’s recusal in cases
involving a cohabitating heterosexual partner or a same-sex
partner and for people within three degrees of these partners
simply because the person is not a “spouse” but rather a “room-
mate.” If someone with an interest in a case is three familial
degrees close to a judge’s roommate, the judge need not recuse
herself. A domestic partner should be treated equally to a
spouse for purposes of recusal because such a partner could
easily influence a judge as much as a spouse and could have
more influence over a judge than an estranged, but still lawfully
married, spouse. Now that the 2007 Code requires recusal
when someone within three degrees of relationship of a judge’s
spouse or a judge’s domestic partner has an interest in a pro-
ceeding, the integrity of the judiciary is improved.16 In fact, the
ABA’s use of “domestic partner” in Rules 2.11 of the Code
strategically and practically promotes judicial integrity.
III. MOST LGBT-FRIENDLY STATES INCLUDED 
“DOMESTIC PARTNER” IN THEIR CJCS  
Most states do not specify the sexual orientation of a
“domestic partner,” preferring instead to use the Code’s broad
definition that is sexuality neutral. Arizona, California, New
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Mexico, Hawaii, Delaware, Connecticut, Maryland, Iowa, New
Hampshire, Washington, Nevada, Wyoming, Kansas, Montana,
Indiana, Utah, Colorado, North Dakota, Nebraska, Tennessee,
and Arkansas included the term “domestic partner” in their
CJCs.17 Iowa, New Hampshire, and Connecticut had all legal-
ized same-sex marriage before the revision of their CJCs to
include the term “domestic partner.” For these three states,
the term “domestic partner” in their CJCs presumably refers to
a person involved in a nonmarital, committed relationship, but
not necessarily to a member of a same-sex couple. 
Connecticut’s Code of Judicial Conduct arguably promoted
LGBT rights by defining “spouse” as a person to whom one is
“legally married or joined in a civil union.”18 Likewise, in New
Hampshire’s code, the definition of “domestic partner”
includes parties who have entered into a civil union.19 New
Hampshire’s Rules of Professional Conduct instruct lawyers
that unmarried same-sex or opposite-sex partners “may be at
least as important as blood or marital relationships.”20
States that have included “civil union” or “domestic partner”
in their CJCs probably did so to recognize that committed rela-
tionships that could improperly influence judges can occur out-
side of legal marriages. Two of the three states that legalized
same-sex marriage before revising their CJCs recognized a part-
ner through a “civil union” as the legal equivalent of “spouse”
or “domestic partner,” consistent with their history of support
for LGBT equality. States with LGBT-friendly public policies
who included “domestic partner” in their CJCs, probably did so
to ensure that all forms of loving relationships are considered
when determining whether a potential conflict exists.
IV. MOST STATES THAT EXCLUDED THE TERM 
“DOMESTIC PARTNER” FROM THEIR CODES HAVE 
A HISTORY OF ANTI-LGBT POLICIES,  BUT SHOULD
STILL INCLUDE “DOMESTIC PARTNER” IN THEIR
CODES DESPITE THAT HISTORY.
Many of the states that rejected the term “domestic partner”
from their CJCs have a demonstrated history of opposing
LGBT equality. Their choice to exclude this term is consistent
with that history and in most cases probably dictated this
choice.  For example, South Dakota, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Missouri, Minnesota, and Maine did not amend their CJCs to
include the term “domestic partner.”21 In South Dakota, no
provision forbids judges from discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation.22 Similarly, Missouri declined to introduce
“domestic partner” into its revised CJC, but also did not
require a judge’s recusal on cases involving the judge’s spouse’s
family.23 South Dakota, Mississippi, and Oklahoma have no
laws that specifically address hate crimes on the basis of sexual
orientation.24 South Dakota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Mis-
souri all also constitutionally prohibit same-sex marriage.25
Additionally, South Dakota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Mis-
souri do not protect LGBT youth in schools, do not prevent
sexual orientation discrimination in housing, disallow hospital
visitation, and allow employers to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation.26 In sum, most states that did not include
the term “domestic partner” in their CJCs had policies in
opposition to LGBT rights. 
There are, however. exceptions to the rule that states with
anti-LGBT policies did not include the term “domestic part-
ner” and states with pro-LGBT policies did. Take Minnesota
and Maine. Although Minnesota and Maine both had laws pro-
hibiting same-sex marriage when they decided to exclude
“domestic partner” from their respective CJCs, both states had
pro-LGBT public policies. The omission of “domestic partner”
in Maine’s and Minnesota’s codes of judicial conduct does not
seem to reflect a state policy of opposition to equal rights for
LGBT people. Indeed, Minnesota has since passed legislation
allowing same-sex marriage, allows same-sex-couple adoption,
and joint and second-parent adoption in some jurisdictions,
and recognizes the rights of same-sex couples to visit one
another in the hospital.27 Likewise, Maine provides for some
spousal rights and for hospital visitation for same-sex couples,
while allowing joint and second-parent adoption for same-sex
couples.28 Although Minnesota’s and Maine’s CJCs left out the
term “domestic partner,” these states do not have a history of
opposing LGBT equality. Yet, the absence of “domestic part-
ner” terminology in their CJCs is easily explained.
In fact, Minnesota rejected the term “domestic partner” and
chose an even more expansive conflict-of-interest recusal
requirement for judges in its state CJC. Minnesota’s Commit-
tee for Judicial Ethics decided that a need for recusal arises out
of a judge’s “intimate relationship” with any person.29 The
committee chose to avoid the term “domestic partner” in favor
of a descriptive phrase.30 Instead of “domestic partner,” the
committee used the phrase “a person with whom the judge has
an intimate relationship” for determining when judges should
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite the LGBT rights movement’s use of “domestic part-
ner” and the ABA’s history of support for LGBT equality, the
ABA emphasized the improvement of America’s judicial
integrity as their reason for inserting “domestic partner” in the
2007 Code. The definition of “domestic partner” in the 2007
Code encompasses heterosexual relationships, but the com-
mon usage of the term “domestic partner”  connotes advocacy
for LGBT people, as demonstrated by the California Family
Code and the Bar Association of San Francisco’s report. How-
ever, even acknowledging the ABA’s LGBT-friendly history, the
ABA acted in the public good to create an appropriate regime
for determining judicial conflicts in the 2007 Code and did not
act only to promote LGBT equality.
Aside from Maine and Minnesota, a state’s policy toward
LGBT rights generally determined its choice to include
“domestic partner” in its CJC, with anti-LGBT states rejecting
the term, even though using “domestic partner” would have
been in their best interest. The Statue of Liberty, perhaps the
most iconic American symbol, clearly preaches inclusion:
“[G]ive me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearn-
ing to breathe free.”36 Echoing the Statue of Liberty’s gospel, let
us applaud the ABA’s practical, integrity-driven policy, which
acknowledges that LGBT people serve in the U.S. judiciary and
makes appropriate provisions to deal with this reality. 
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recuse themselves.31 The Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct
defined “intimate relationship” as “a continuing relationship
involving sexual relations as defined in Rule 1.8(j)(1) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.”32  Although excluding
“domestic partner” from Minnesota’s CJC, the committee sub-
stituted a phrase that is equally protective of judicial integrity
and in keeping with their pro-LGBT policies.
Maine likewise protected judicial integrity and LGBT equal-
ity despite not using the term “domestic partner.” Maine
amended its CJC in June 2009, but excluded the term “domes-
tic partner.”33 However, Maine’s 2009 CJC created a more
expansive definition of family by requiring a judge to be
recused when the case involves “a person with whom the judge
maintains a close personal relationship.”34 This definition of
family conceivably includes same-sex and opposite-sex part-
ners and therefore protects integrity like the term “domestic
partnership.” But at least one recommendation was made in
favor of adopting the term “domestic partner” as part of any
possible amendments to Maine’s CJC.35 Although Maine
decided to reject the term “domestic partner” from the state’s
CJC, the omission of “domestic partner” does not seem to
reflect an anti-LGBT state policy. Still, these states are the
exception, not the rule. 
Although anti-LGBT states may have sought to make their
CJCs consistent with their policy regarding sexual orientation,
their choice to exclude the term “domestic partner” in their
CJCs fails to protect the public from potential and actual con-
flicts. For example, although Missouri’s CJC did not include
“domestic partner” terminology, Missouri has no recusal
requirement for a judge’s heterosexual spouse’s relations and
therefore creates an equality of treatment, but less protection
for the public from judicial conflicts of interest. Missouri’s CJC
requires recusal only if a spouse or a person living with a judge
has an interest in a case before that judge. Because the ABA
probably did not include “domestic partner” within the Code’s
terminology only to champion LGBT rights, but also to
improve judicial integrity, a state’s anti-LGBT policies should
not impact the inclusion of the term “domestic partner” into
their judicial ethics codes.
Without equal and codified recusal requirements for judges’
domestic partners, judicial integrity is at risk, and  LGBT
judges risk becoming targets of ethics complaints despite full
compliance with existing state rules. To promote justice, effi-
ciency, and public confidence in state judicial systems, even
states with a history of opposing LGBT equality should include
“domestic partner” in their CJCs.
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